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Abstract 
Experts’ beliefs embody a present state of knowledge. It is desirable to take this 
knowledge into account when doing analyses or making decisions. Yet ranking experts 
based on the merit of their beliefs is a difficult task. In this paper we show how experts 
can be ranked based on their knowledge and their level of (un)certainty. By letting 
experts specify their knowledge in the form of a probability distribution we can assess 
how accurately they can predict new data, and how appropriate their level of 
(un)certainty is. The expert’s specified probability distribution can be seen as a prior in 
a Bayesian statistical setting. By extending an existing prior-data conflict measure to 
evaluate multiple priors, i.e. experts’ beliefs, we can compare experts with each other 
and the data to evaluate their appropriateness. Using this method new research 
questions can be asked and answered, for instance: Which expert predicts the new data 
best? Is there agreement between my experts and the data? Which experts’ 
representation is more valid or useful? Can we reach convergence between expert 
judgement and data? We provided an empirical example ranking (regional) directors of 
a large financial institution based on their predictions of turnover.  
Keywords: Bayes, Decision making, Expert judgement, Expert knowledge, 
Prior-data conflict, Ranking 
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USING THE DATA AGREEMENT CRITERION TO RANK EXPERTS’ 
BELIEFS 
In the process of scientific inference, the knowledge and beliefs of experts can 
provide vital information. Experts’ beliefs represent the current state of knowledge. It 
is desirable to be able to include this information in analyses or decision making 
processes. This can be done by using the Bayesian statistical framework. In Bayesian 
statistics there are two sources of information, prior knowledge and data (Gelman, 
Stern, & Rubin, 2014; Lynch, 2007; Zyphur, Oswald, & Rupp, 2015). The prior can be 
composed of expert knowledge (Bolsinova, 2016; O’Hagan et al., 2006; Zondervan-
Zwijnenburg, van de Schoot-Hubeek, Lek, Hoijtink, & van de Schoot, 2017). Yet 
deciding which expert yield the most appropriate information remains a critical 
challenge, for which we present a solution in this paper.  
To be able to include expert knowledge in Bayesian statistics, it must be 
represented in the form of a probability distribution. This can be done via a process 
called expert elicitation. Elicitation entails the extraction of expert knowledge and 
translating this knowledge into the probabilistic representation (O’Hagan et al., 2006).  
By using a probabilistic representation we include both knowledge and (un)certainty of 
experts. However, experts are forced to use the representation system that belongs to 
the statistical realm. Therefore it is essential that the elicitation process is carefully 
constructed so we do not introduce unnecessary and unjust bias.  
Once expert knowledge is elicited and data is collected, it is desirable to find a 
measure that naturally compares two pieces of information. The measure should assess 
the extent to which the data and expert knowledge resemble and conflict with each 
other. As the expert knowledge can be contained within a prior it seems logical to assess 
the discrepancy or similarity of such a prior with respect to the data by means of a prior-
data conflict measure.  
Several prior-data conflict measures have been developed, for instance Box 
(1980) was the first to propose the use of the prior predictive distribution and test if the 
collected data was unlikely for this predictive distribution. The predictive distribution 
is the totality of all samples that could occur if the model assumptions were true. By 
reference of the density of the observed data to the predictive reference distribution, it 
can be evaluated if the data are unlikely to be generated by the model. A modification 
to this approach was proposed by Evans and Moshonov (2006) who suggested the 
restriction of the method to minimal sufficient statistics. For critics of this method see 
Evans and Jang (2011).  
Both the methods of Box (1980) and Evans and Moshonov (2006) result in a p-
value, and thus leave the determination of the existence of prior-data conflict up to 
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debate depending on an arbitrary cut-off value. Further criticism comes from Young 
and Pettit (1996) who argue that a measure being based on a tail area does not produce 
the required behavior, if two priors are both specified at the correct value the more 
precise prior is not always preferred. A desirable property for a prior-data conflict 
measure would be to measure how one probability distribution diverges from a second 
expected probability distribution, not the distance between distributions. The Data 
Agreement Criterion (DAC) proposed by Bousquet (2008) is based on Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergences which ensures that prior-data conflict decisions are not only 
based on the tail area. Furthermore the DAC incorporates a clear classification of prior-
data conflict. 
 Prior-data conflict measures are currently used to evaluate for example, the 
suitability of certain priors in the estimation of models or to uncover potential suitability 
problems with design, prior or both. Examples can be found in for instance Walley, 
Smith, Gale, and Woodward (2015); Fu, Celeux, Bousquet, and Couplet (2015) and Fu, 
Couplet, and Bousquet (2015). We found no previous use of prior-data conflict 
measures to rank sources of prior information. Yet when we have two experts some 
very interesting questions can already be answered, for instance: Which expert predicts 
the new data best? Is there agreement between my experts and the data? Which expert’s 
representation is more valid or useful? Can we reach convergence between expert 
judgement and data?  
Predicting new data can be an indication of knowledge of the factors underlying 
the data generating mechanism. Thus if one expert outperforms another in predicting 
new data this might be indicative of more expertise. Concerning the question if we can 
reach convergence between expert judgement and data it is interesting to consider the 
difference between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is 
uncertainty due to randomness or chance, e.g. market volatility, whilst epistemic 
uncertainty is uncertainty due to a lack of knowledge. By expressing expert knowledge 
and data in the same framework a learning process can start that has the potential to 
eliminate epistemic uncertainty and reveal the true extend of the aleatory uncertainty. 
This also implies, for the question which representation is more useful, that being 
overconfident can be a bad thing. When all epistemic uncertainty is eliminated there is 
still an appropriate amount of uncertainty to be specified, the extend of the aleatory 
uncertainty.   
In the remainder of this paper we present the following work. We provide a 
detailed description of the DAC and show why this measure is especially suitable to 
compare expert judgement and data. As the DAC currently determines the degree of 
prior-data conflict of one prior we propose an adjustment of the statistic in this paper to 
allow the ranking of multiple sources of prior information, i.e. multiple experts’ beliefs. 
Finally we provide an empirical example to show that the adapted DAC can be used to 
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compare and rank several experts based on their beliefs. In the empirical example we 
rank experts from a large financial institution based on their predictions of new data 
concerning turnover. The empirical study in this article received approval from our 
internal Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of Utrecht 
University. The letter of approval can be found in the data archive for this study along 
with all other code and data, as far as contracts permit us, to ensure everything presented 
in this paper is reproducible. The data archive can be found on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF) webpage for this project as https://osf.io/u57qs. 
Expert-Data (Dis)Agreement 
Within this section we provide a detailed and mathematical description of the 
DAC before proposing the adaptation that allows the ranking of multiple experts’ 
beliefs at the same time. The DAC is based on a ratio of KL divergences therefore we 
will first describe the KL divergence (Kullback & Leibler, 1951). 
Kullback-Leibler divergence 
The KL divergence describes measurements of informative regret, or in other 
words it measures the loss of information that occurs if one choses a certain distribution 
even though another is the preferred distribution. This loss of information or 
informative regret is expressed in a numerical value and the higher this value is the 
more loss of information is present, i.e. the greater the discrepancy is between the two 
distributions. The KL divergence is calculated by the following function  
 𝐾𝐿(π1||π2) = ∫ π1(θ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔
Θ
π1(θ)
π2(θ)
 𝑑θ, (1) 
where Θ is the set of all accessible values for the parameter θ, π1(θ) denotes the 
preferred distribution and π2(θ) denotes the chosen distribution that approximates the 
preferred distribution. In Figure 1 it can be seen what KL divergences between two 
normal distributions look like. The value of the KL divergence is equal to the area under 
the curve of the function. The greater the discrepancy between the distributions, the 
greater the area under the curve. This also follows from Equation 1, if the two 
distributions are equal than π1(θ) / π2(θ) equals one everywhere. As log(1) = 0 there 
is no longer any density and there is thus no area under the curve and the KL divergence, 
or loss of information is equal to zero. To support understanding of the KL divergence 
we build a shiny application that provides an interactive variant of Figure 1 which can 
be found via the OSF webpage at https://osf.io/u57qs. 
If we are able to represent both the data and the expert knowledge in a 
distributional form, a discrepancy between the two can be expressed by the KL 
divergence between the two. As we might have multiple experts but only one source of 
RANKING EXPERTS’ BELIEFS   5 
 
data it seems natural that the data be considered the reference distribution which is 
approximated by the experts’ beliefs expressed as probability distributions. That this is 
indeed the case in the DAC we will see in the following where we elaborate on the 
details of this prior-data conflict measure developed by Bousquet (2008).  
Data Agreement Criterion 
The DAC, as mentioned before, is a ratio of two KL divergences. A KL 
divergence provides an indication of the discrepancy between two distributions, yet has 
no inherent decision on when a certain amount of loss of information relevant. To be 
able to objectively conclude when prior-data conflict exists, the DAC compares the loss 
of information that a certain prior has with respect to the data with the loss of 
information that a benchmark prior has with respect to the data. The KL divergence 
between the chosen prior and the data is the numerator in the ratio whilst the KL 
divergence between the benchmark prior and the data is the denominator in the ratio. A 
benchmark prior should be chosen such that the posterior distribution is completely 
dominated by the observed data (Bernardo, 1979). In other words the benchmark prior 
should be an uninformative prior. A benchmark prior can be for instance a Jeffreys prior 
(Jeffreys, 1946), however Bousquet (2008) mentions that in applied studies a 
convenient or intuitive prior measure seems reasonable. Using the notation of 
Bousquet, the DAC can be expressed by 
 DAC =  
𝐾𝐿[πJ(θ|𝐲)||π(θ)]
𝐾𝐿[πJ(θ|𝐲)||πJ(θ)]
 (2) 
where π(θ) denotes prior that is to be evaluated, e.g. the expert’s beliefs, πJ(θ) denotes 
a benchmark prior and πJ(θ|𝐲) denotes the posterior distribution, derived from the 
benchmark prior and the observed data y.  
 πJ(θ|𝐲) can be considered as a fictitious expert that is perfectly in agreement 
with the data, having no prior knowledge and being informed by the observations 
(Bousquet, 2008). It is therefore the ideal reference distribution in comparison to which 
we measure the loss of information. The benchmark, being an uninformative prior, 
should by definition not be conflicting with the data and therefore serves as a good 
reference point. If a prior conflicts less with the data than the benchmark does, we 
should not consider the prior to be in prior-data conflict. If a prior conflicts more with 
the data than the benchmark prior does, we do consider the prior to be in prior-data 
conflict. Hence if the DAC > 1, we conclude prior-data conflict, because the KL 
divergence of the prior is larger than the KL divergence of the benchmark prior, 
otherwise we conclude no prior-data conflict. 
To illustrate the calculation of the DAC we provide an numerical example 
together with a visual representation that can be found in Figure 2, note that the colors 
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of the distributions in Figure 2 correspond to the colors in the text. Consider the case in 
which  πJ(θ|𝐲)~𝑁(0,1), π(θ)~𝑁(0.5,1) and πJ(θ)~𝑁(0,900). The DAC is than 
calculated by taking the ratio of the following two KL divergences, 
𝐾𝐿[πJ(θ|𝐲)||π(θ)] = 0.125 and 𝐾𝐿[πJ(θ|𝐲)||πJ(θ)] = 2.902, such that 
DAC=0.125/2.902=0.043. The DAC<1, thus we conclude no prior data conflict exists, 
π(θ) is a better approximation of πJ(θ|𝐲) than πJ(θ).  
Extension to multiple experts 
The DAC such as described in the section above determines prior-data conflict 
for a single prior that is to be evaluated. However, when we have multiple experts that 
each hold their own beliefs and we express each of these in the form of a probability 
distribution we can ask some interesting questions. In Figure 3 we see some examples 
of situations that we could encounter. In panel A of Figure 3 we see a situation in which 
experts differ in their predictions and their (un)certainty. The question that arises from 
the situation in panel A is which of these predictions best approximates the information 
that the data provides us? Panel B of Figure 3 shows a scenario in which the experts are 
predicting similar to each other but all differ with respect to the data. The question that 
arises from the situation in panel B is which of the two is correct, the data or the experts?  
To be able to answer these types of questions we need to extend the DAC to 
incorporate multiple experts’ priors, which are to be evaluated against the same 
posterior distribution, reflecting the data, and the same benchmark prior. The DAC thus 
needs to become a vector of length D resulting in 
 DACd =  
𝐾𝐿[πJ(θ|𝐲)||πd(θ)]
𝐾𝐿[πJ(θ|𝐲)||πJ(θ)]
 (3) 
where the subscript d denotes the different input for D experts so DACd =
DAC1, … , DACD and πd(θ) = π1(θ), … , πD(θ). This extension of the KL divergence in 
which not one but a vector of models are entered to be compared with the preferred 
model is straightforward and has previously been described in the context of the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973), e.g. Burnham and Anderson (2002, chapter 
2). 
Influence benchmark 
The choice for a specific benchmark can influence the results of the DACd. 
Bousquet (2008) mentions that in applied studies a convenient or intuitive prior for the 
benchmark seems reasonable. However it is important to realize that the choice for a 
benchmark prior does influence the results of the analysis in the sense that the cut-off 
value for determining prior-data conflict will shift as the KL divergence between 
πJ(θ|𝐲) and πJ(θ) differs. Yet as long as the benchmark prior is an uninformative prior 
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in the sense that the posterior distribution is dominated by the data, πJ(θ|𝐲) will remain 
largely unchanged. This ensures that the DACd has the nice property that when multiple 
experts are compared their ranking does not change dependent on which uninformative 
benchmark is chosen. This follows from the stability of πJ(θ|𝐲) which ensures that the 
KL divergences between πJ(θ|𝐲) and πd(θ) are stable.  
Concerning the benchmark it is useful to note that the benchmark need not be 
restricted to an uninformative prior, but using an informative prior changes the 
interpretation and behavior of the DAC. When πJ(θ) is informative πJ(θ|𝐲) is sensitive 
to the specification of πJ(θ) and the KL divergence between πJ(θ|𝐲) and πd(θ) need 
no longer be stable, influencing the ranking of the experts. The choice for πJ(θ), if it is 
informative, will influence the cut-off value for determining prior-data conflict will 
shift.  
To show the above described behavior visually we present the results of a 
simulation study in Figure 4. We show four different conditions, that is four different 
choices for benchmark priors, to illustrate the change in behavior for the DACd. In all 
four situations we use the same data, y, which is a sample of 100 from a standard normal 
distribution. πd(θ) is always a normal distribution and we show the DACd values for 
normal distributions with a means running from the mean of the data -4 to the mean of 
the data +4 and standard deviations running from 0.1 to 3. The four panels show 
different conditions for the benchmarks such that in panel A πJ(θ)~𝑁(0,10000), in 
panel B πJ(θ)~𝑁(0,1), in panel C πJ(θ)~𝑈(−50,50) and in panel D πJ(θ)~𝑁(5,0.5). 
It can be seen that for the two uninformative priors in panels A and C the behavior of 
the DACd is stable. We would expect to draw the same conclusions and rank experts in 
the same way independent of the choice of either benchmark. Yet when we specify an 
informative benchmark such as in panels B and D we see that both the behavior of the 
DACd and the determination of prior-data conflict shift. In panel B an informative and 
accurate benchmark leads almost invariable to concluding prior-data conflict for πd(θ). 
In panel D the informative but inaccurate benchmark leads us to conclude prior-data 
conflict only if πd(θ) is in the wrong location and has a very small variance.   
The simulation study presented in Figure 4 shows that the choice for a certain 
benchmark can influence your results, so even if a convenient or intuitive prior seems 
reasonable it should be carefully chosen. Researchers should be aware that their ranking 
is stable as long as an uninformative prior is chosen but it might not be if the benchmark 
prior contains information.  
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Empirical Example 
 To show that the DACd can be used to evaluate and rank several experts 
based on their beliefs we conducted an empirical study. The team that participated 
consisted of 11 experts, 10 regional directors and one director. All were eligible to be 
included in the study. Seven experts were randomly invited to participate in the 
research, if any of the selected experts did not want to participate they were classified 
as not selected in the research. In this way we avoided the possibility of group pressure 
to participate. In the end four out of the seven selected experts participated in an 
elicitation. The experts (D = 4) provided forecasts concerning average turnover per 
professional in the first quarter of the year 2016. The (regional) directors are considered 
experts in knowledge concerning market opportunities, market dynamics and 
estimating the capabilities of the professionals to seize opportunities. Based on these 
skills we expected that they could predict the average turnover per professional in the 
entire country in the first quarter of 2016. All information related to the empirical study 
can be found on the OSF webpage for this paper at https://osf.io/u57qs. 
Elicitation procedure 
To get the experts to express their beliefs in the form of a probability distribution 
we make use of the Five-Step Method (Veen, Stoel, Zondervan-Zwijnenburg & van de 
Schoot, 2017). To encapsulate the beliefs of the expert, the Five-Step Method actively 
separates two elements of the knowledge of the expert, the tacit knowledge of the expert 
and their (un)certainty. In step one a location parameter is elicited from the expert. This 
location parameter captures the tacit knowledge of the expert. To verify that the 
representation of the beliefs is accurate, step two is the incorporation of feedback 
implemented through the use of elicitation software. Experts can accept the 
representation of their beliefs or adjust their input. In step three the (un)certainty of the 
experts is obtained and represented in the form of a scale and shape parameter. Step 
four is to provide feedback using elicitation software to verify the accurate 
representation of the expert’s (un)certainty, which they can either accept or they can 
adjust their input until the representation is correct. The fifth step is to use the elicited 
expert’s beliefs, in this case to determine their DAC score.  
The experts first performed a practice elicitation for their own sales team before 
moving on to the whole country. The practice run enabled them to acquaint themselves 
with the elicitation procedure and software we used. Only in the case that the director 
participated this practice run would not be possible. The elicited distributions where 
restricted to be skewed normal distributions such that πd(θ)~ 𝑆𝑁(μ0, σ0
2, γ0), where 
subscript d denotes expert d=1,…,D, μ0 denotes the prior mean, σ0
2 denotes the prior 
variance and γ0 denotes the prior skewness. The shape parameter γ0 is based upon a 
general method for the transformation of symmetric distributions into skewed 
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distributions as described by Equation 1 in Fernandez and Steel (1998). Table 1 
provides an overview of the elicited distributions for the four experts in this empirical 
study. The distributions are based upon transformed data to avoid revealing business-
sensitive information.  
Ranking the experts 
The predictions of the experts concerned the average turnover per professional 
(N=104). The benchmark we have chosen is a uniform distribution running from 0 to 5 
which, given the scale of the transformed data and the impossibility of obtaining a 
negative turnover, seems an intuitive and uninformative prior. This is in line with the 
prior used by Bousquet (2008) in his Example 1 concerning a normal model. We 
obtained the posterior distribution using the rjags R-package (Plummer, 2016), such 
that πJ(θ|𝐲)~𝑁(μ1, σ1
2) where μ1 denotes the posterior mean and σ1
2 denotes the 
posterior variance. We used 4 chains of 25,000 samples after a burn-in period of 1000 
samples per chain. Visually inspection and Gelman-Rubin diagnostics did not point 
towards problems with convergence of the chains and inspection of the autocorrelation 
plots showed no issues concerning autocorrelation. Table 2 displays the KL divergences 
for πd(θ) and  π
J(θ) with  πJ(θ|𝐲)~𝑁(2.29, 0.01) as preferred distribution and the 
resulting DACd scores and ranking. Figure 5 visually presents all relevant distributions 
concerning the empirical study. Figure 6 panels A through E visually presents all KL 
divergences from Table 2.  
The results show that expert four provided the best prediction out of the experts. 
Experts one and two provided similar predictions concerning their tacit knowledge, 
they expected almost the same value for the location parameter, however expert one 
was less certain about this prediction. As the prediction of the location was not entirely 
correct, the increased uncertainty of expert one means this expert provided more 
plausibility to the regions of the parameter space that were also supported by the data. 
Therefore expert one is rewarded with a better DAC score in comparison to expert two. 
In this case the differences even cause a different conclusion, namely expert one is not 
in prior-data conflict and expert two is in prior-data conflict. Expert three provided a 
prediction that to a large extend did not support the same parameter space as the data. 
In fact expert three provides a lot of support for regions of the parameter space that the 
data did not support. The discrepancy between expert three and the data was of such 
proportions that besides expert two also for expert three we concluded a prior-data 
conflict to exist. If we would have had no information beforehand, except knowing the 
region within which the average turnover per professional could fall, we would have 
lost less information than by considering the predictions of experts two and three. If 
decisions should be made concerning average turnover per professional, decision 
makers would be wise to consult expert four, as this expert seems to have the best 
knowledge of the underlying factors driving these results. 
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Discussion 
The use of KL divergences raises two important methodological issues, see 
Burnham and Anderson (2002, chapter 2) for an elaborated discussion. First, the 
preferred model should be known. Second the parameters should be known for the 
model that is evaluated, i.e. the formalized expert prior. The issues make the KL 
divergence a measure that according to some, see for instance Burnham and Anderson, 
cannot be used for real world problems and previously led to the development of the 
AIC (Akaike, 1973), which uses the relative expected KL divergence. The AIC deals 
with the two issues by taking the preferred model as a constant in comparing multiple 
models and using the maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the models 
to be evaluated, introducing a penalty term for the bias this induces. 
We conclude that we can use the KL divergence in the context of the DACd and 
with the following reasoning. We define  πJ(θ|𝐲) to be the preferred distribution as it 
reflects a fictional expert that is completely informed by the data and thus it is known. 
In the case of the empirical example the data is even the true state of affairs, these where 
the actual realizations of the turnover for each professional. Concerning that the 
parameter for the models to be evaluated, πd(θ), should reflect the exact beliefs of the 
experts. We use the Five-Step Method (Veen et al., 2017) which incorporates feedback 
at each stage of the elicitation, ensuring that experts confirm that their believes are 
accurately represented by the location, shape and scale parameters. We acknowledge 
that the parameters exactly representing an expert’s beliefs cannot be exactly known, 
but we feel confident that the procedure we use at least aims to obtain very accurate 
representations. As experts can continue to adapt their input until they are satisfied with 
the representation of their beliefs, this should overcome problems with the second issue. 
While we use πJ(θ|𝐲), and thus know the truly preferred distribution, and we 
firmly believe that we properly represent the experts’ beliefs, it seems highly 
implausible that a DAC score of 0 can be attained. Predicting future events entails 
incorporating an estimate for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. Yet even if 
epistemic uncertainty is eradicated it is unlikely one estimates precisely the optimal 
location and exactly the optimal amount of aleatory uncertainty.  
Although we do not explicitly separate aleatory and epistemic uncertainty 
within the procedure, we are able to gain an indication of the appropriate amount of 
aleatory uncertainty.  πJ(θ|𝐲) provides an excellent indication of the appropriate 
aleatory uncertainty. Given that one had no knowledge beforehand and is rationally 
guided by the data, following probabilistic reasoning, one arrives at the posterior belief 
represented by  πJ(θ|𝐲). The posterior described the range of values that would have 
been plausible given this information. Given that the posterior is constructed via 
probabilistic reasoning, the uncertainty concerning the parameter is an indication of 
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appropriate aleatory uncertainty given the information one has. This indication is 
however conditional on the fact that the data provide an accurate representation of the 
state of affairs.  
Given that we can attain information on both the expected value for the 
parameter of interest, the appropriate amount of aleatory uncertainty and the quality of 
the approximation by each expert, we can start a learning process. By sharing the 
reasons behind the choices they made, experts can learn from one another as the 
evidence shows which reasoning lead to the most accurate predictions. The data can 
inform the experts so they can adjust their estimates and uncertainty. Through this 
evaluation expertise can increase and in the long run convergence should be reached 
between both different experts’ predictions and between the experts and the data. When 
this convergence in reached, this indicates that, at least part of, the epistemic uncertainty 
is gone and we have better understanding of the data generating processes and are better 
able to make informed decision.  
In the empirical example we can already see some opportunities for learning. 
For example, expert three misestimated the location of the parameter, which indicates 
at least to some extend faulty or missing tacit knowledge. By starting a dialogue with 
the other experts, he or she could learn why they all estimated the average turnover per 
professional to be higher. Expert one and two had almost identical predictions 
concerning the location but expert one expressed more uncertainty. Perhaps this 
indicated more acknowledgement of epistemic uncertainty, a dialogue could shed more 
light on the differences in choices of expert one and two.  
Concerning the appropriateness of the ranking that is obtained using the DACd, 
we have the following to add. One could argue that perhaps the sample entails extreme 
data. Yet even if this is true, the experts should have considered the data to be plausible, 
for it did occur. Thus if an expert exhibits prior-data conflict or does not perform well 
compared to others, this expert simply did not expect that these data where likely or 
plausible. By incorporating (un)certainty in the evaluation, the DACd produces the 
required behavior to fairly compare experts’ beliefs. As noted earlier, Young and Pettit 
(1996) argue that a prior-data conflict measure should not be based on a tail area as a 
more precise prior would not always be preferred if two priors are both specified at the 
correct value. We argue that this property would in fact also be undesirable in a prior-
data conflict measure. Given that it is appropriate to take aleatory uncertainty into 
account, a prior can be over specific such that it does not do right by the aleatory 
principles underlying the data generating mechanism. The DACd rewards specifying an 
appropriate amount of uncertainty and penalizes overconfidence. We believe that the 
properties of the DACd are such that, given unbiased and unpolluted data, the DACd 
ranking of experts truly insinuates differences in expertise.  
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Figure 1. KL divergences between two normal distributions. In this example π1 is a 
standard normal distribution and π2 is a normal distribution with a mean of 1 and a 
variance of 1. The value of the KL divergence is equal to the area under the curve of 
the function. 
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Figure 2. Calculating the DAC. In this example πJ(θ|𝐲) is a standard normal 
distribution, π(θ) is a normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a variance of 1 and 
πJ(θ) is a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 900. The DAC < 1, 
thus no prior-data conflict is concluded.  
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Figure 3. Scenarios in which there are multiple experts and one source of data. Panel 
A shows a experts differing in prediction and (un)certainty, all (dis)agreeing to a 
certain extend with the data. Panel B shows a scenario in which all experts disagree 
with the data, which results in the question which of the sources of information is 
correct? 
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Figure 4. The effect on the behavior of the DACd for different choices for benchmark 
priors. All panels use the same data (N=100) from a standard normal distribution and 
the same variations for πd(θ) which are normal distribution for which the parameters 
for the mean and standard deviation are given on the x-axis and y-axis of the panels. In 
panel A πJ(θ)~𝑁(0,10000), in panel B πJ(θ)~𝑁(0,1), in panel C πJ(θ)~𝑈(−50,50) 
and in panel D πJ(θ)~𝑁(5,0.5). 
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Figure 5. Visual presentation of all relevant distributions for the empirical study; 
πd(θ),  π
J and  πJ(θ|𝐲).  
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Figure 6. All KL divergences for πd(θ) (panels A, B, C and D) and  π
J (panel E) with 
 πJ(θ|𝐲) as the distribution that is to be approximated. Panel A is for expert one, panel 
B for expert two, panel C for expert three and panel D for expert four.
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Table 1 
The Values of the Hyper Parameters of πd(θ) for the Empirical Study. 
 μ0 σ0 γ0 
Expert 1 2.15 0.09 0.78 
Expert 2 2.16 0.07 0.82 
Expert 3 1.97 0.11 0.82 
Expert 4 2.35 0.11 0.94 
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Table 2 
KL divergences for the experts’ priors and the benchmark prior with πJ(θ|𝐲) as the 
distribution that is to be approximated presented with resulting DACd scores and 
ranking of the experts’ beliefs.   
 KL divergence DACd Ranking 
Expert 1 1.43 0.56 2 
Expert 2 2.86 1.12 3 
Expert 3 5.76 2.26 4 
Expert 4 0.19 0.07 1 
Benchmark 2.55 - - 
 
 
